He lacks Wladimir’s speed, timing, defense, and destructive power, but the basic construction is similar. That familiarity should benefit Joshua, who spent years studying Wladimir, training alongside him, and eventually fighting him at Wembley in 2017.
Facing Knyba would not reproduce Fury’s movement, feints, stance changes, or ability to invent his way through a difficult fight. It would give Joshua experience against another towering heavyweight who knows how to keep the action at long range and smother opponents once they get inside.
The matchup becomes more appealing because Knyba is not harmless. His power is respectable enough to test the weakness that now defines Joshua’s career.
Joshua’s punch resistance and recovery can no longer be trusted after his fights against Daniel Dubois and Kristian Prenga.
The younger AJ survived a crushing right hand from Wladimir, regained control, and stopped him in the eleventh round. He had the physical resilience and confidence to fight his way through a crisis. That version of Joshua is gone.
Against Dubois, the consequences of catching AJ cleanly and denying him time to recover were obvious. Once hurt, Joshua became rigid, lost track of incoming shots, and struggled to restore order.
His fight with Prenga provided more evidence that Joshua no longer processes hard punches as well as he once did.
Although Knyba does not punch like Dubois, he hits hard enough to stop Joshua. His height allows him to generate leverage on the straight right, particularly when an opponent remains directly in front of him or pulls back without changing angles.
AJ would have to close the distance behind his jab, keep his head moving, and remain defensively responsible after throwing. One lazy exit or mistimed entry might give Knyba the opening needed to wreck the Fury fight.
That danger is precisely what makes Knyba a worthwhile warm up. A harmless opponent would tell Eddie Hearn nothing about Joshua’s readiness.
The blueprint for beating Knyba was supplied by Agit Kabayel, who stopped him inside three rounds in January. Kabayel refused to conduct the fight from the outside, where Knyba’s 86 inch reach gave him the advantage. He applied pressure, shortened the distance, and forced the taller man to work at an uncomfortable pace.
There is little doubt that Joshua possesses the strength and power to follow that approach, but his recent habits create doubts.
Under Ben Davison, AJ has often settled into cautious outside boxing built around the jab and isolated right hands. That approach may suit him against shorter opponents who must cross open space to reach him. It makes less sense against Knyba, who owns the longer reach and wants a slow fight at the end of his jab.
AJ cannot afford to admire Knyba’s size from the outside. He would need to attack the body, force him backward, and make him reset his feet. Knyba becomes much less effective when denied the time and space required to extend his punches.
That would test Joshua’s willingness to take calculated chances. Moving into mid range places him closer to Knyba’s right hand, but remaining outside allows the Polish heavyweight to dictate the pace. Finding the balance between aggression and recklessness has repeatedly escaped AJ.
Reaching Knyba would solve only the first part of the problem. Against Andy Ruiz Jr., he regularly wrapped up and smothered the shorter fighter whenever Ruiz crossed the distance.
Fury uses that tactic even more effectively. He leans his weight across an opponent’s shoulders, forces him to carry the load, and drains his legs during long clinches. It is not glamorous, but it has become a vital part of his heavyweight style.
While Knyba cannot match Fury’s inside craft, he can give Joshua a physical rehearsal for those wrestling exchanges. AJ would have to keep his arms free, create enough room to punch, and avoid wasting energy trying to overpower a taller man in static clinches.
Too much muscular weight has caused Joshua to burn energy unnecessarily in previous fights. Continually wrestling with a heavyweight of Knyba’s size would test both his conditioning and his patience.
Frustration with the holding may tempt Joshua into lunging from too far away. That is where the straight right becomes dangerous.
Knyba’s victory over Andy Ruiz Jr. supplies more than a recognizable name for the promotion. It connects him directly to the most damaging defeat of Joshua’s career.
The loss to Ruiz destroyed Joshua’s aura at Madison Square Garden in 2019. Although AJ comfortably won the rematch, questions about his confidence and punch resistance followed him from that night onward.
By beating Ruiz, dropping him in the seventh round, and controlling much of the fight with his jab and reach, Knyba added a former unified champion to his record. The official scores were 117-110 and 114-113 twice, although the two narrow cards understated his control.
That creates an easy promotional story. Joshua would be fighting the man who just dominated his old conqueror while testing himself against the physical dimensions he will encounter against Fury.
The psychological angle should not be exaggerated. Beating Knyba would not erase what happened against Ruiz. It would still allow Joshua to show that he can dominate the fighter who just reduced Ruiz to a fading former champion.
Hearn cannot treat Knyba as an opponent controlled entirely by Matchroom. The Polish heavyweight signed a multiyear promotional agreement with Bob Arum’s Top Rank in 2023 and remains listed on the company’s roster. That introduces promotional politics.
From Top Rank’s perspective, the money and exposure attached to a Joshua fight may be tempting, especially after Knyba rebuilt himself by beating Ruiz. The company would also know that his size and right hand give him a genuine chance to spoil the larger plan.
Calling Knyba a warm up sacrifice would undersell his value. He has already fought Kabayel for an interim heavyweight title and now owns a win over Ruiz. Top Rank would likely want proper compensation and a favorable arrangement before placing him across the ring from one of Matchroom’s most valuable fighters.
Warren’s connection to Fury adds another consideration, although he does not control Knyba’s contract. Anyone invested in Fury versus Joshua must decide if the preparation value justifies placing AJ in another dangerous fight first. The financial calculation may ultimately kill the idea.
Heavy investment from Turki Alalshikh in both Joshua and Fury has helped keep their fight alive as one of the largest events available in British boxing. Sending Joshua against a towering heavyweight with a hard right hand creates a direct threat to that investment.
If Knyba knocks out AJ, the Fury fight loses much of its commercial power. It may still happen because of the names involved, but it would no longer carry the same sporting value or sense of occasion.
That gives the match its central contradiction. Knyba is the ideal warm up for Fury because he reproduces several of the physical problems Joshua must solve. He is also the wrong warm up from a business perspective because he carries enough power to destroy the entire plan.
On experience and technical development, Joshua should be able to pressure Knyba, attack his body, and exploit the weaknesses Kabayel exposed. But “should” offers little comfort with Joshua now.
Winning would not require Knyba to outbox him for 12 rounds. He would only need to survive long enough to land one clean right hand on a fighter whose recovery has badly deteriorated.
That is why the fight works. Knyba can prepare Joshua for Fury’s dimensions, force him to solve the clinching problem, and test the punch resistance Fury would attack. If AJ cannot safely handle that assignment, he has no business moving directly into the Fury fight.